Introduction
This paper has several aims.
First of all, it seeks to tell a reaonable story about how asymmetric treatment of high-seniority "insider" workers and non-tenured "outsiders" can give rise to bad macroeconomic steady states in a wage economy. The ultimate source of the unemployment-inflation dilemma in this story is the idea that low-seniority outsider workers end up unemployed because they have too little voice in negotiations over wages.
The paper then considers profit sharing as a possible alternative payment mechanism having the automatically corrective incentive property that employers always want to hire more outsiders. Given the assumptions of the model, it is shown that widespread profit sharing will result in lower unemployment and more output even though it is individually rational for insiders always to prefer wages over profit shares. Put more fancifully, a wage system has a negative macroeconomic externality, while a profit-sharing system has favorable externality effects on employment and, indirectly, on price stability.
If the logic of the externality argument is accepted the path is open for government policy to encourage widespread profit sharing as an instrument for lowering the iNAIEU.
I am very grateful to Dennis Snower and an anonymous referee for their unusually helpful and thorough comments on an earlier draft.
They forced me to rethink through what I was doing, and I hope the paper is the better for it.
My colleague Robert M. Solow also made useful suggestions. None of these people should be blamed for the inadequacies that remain nor do they necessarily agree with my conclusions.
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The Cast of Characters
There are four key players in the models insider workers, outsider workers, firms, and the government.
In making much hinge on the distinction between insider workers and outsider workers, I am following the pioneering work of Lindbeck and Snower.T hey identify insiders as those who already have a job and outsiders as those who are unemployed or laid off. A theory or paradigm is then developed, based largely on the asymmetric cost of replacing insiders by outsiders, which provides a microeconomic explanation for the prevalence of involuntary unemployment.
The theory clarifies why outsiders do not underbid insiders, posits a major role for unions, and suggests novel policy measures to lower unemployment by reducing the market power of insiders vis-a-vis outsiders.
Overall, I believe the insider-outsider paradigm has a strong resonance of plausibility and provides the most reasonable microeconomic framework yet put forth for thinking about unemplojrment-related issues.
Actually, I would perhaps go even further than Lindbeck and Snower in stressing the deep-seated nature of the insider-outsider paradigm, which in my opinion transcends mere job markets and labor unions. In every sphere of social relations there tends to be a fundamental distinction between the relatively sympathetic treatment of those insider members of the family, community, or nation with whom we identify, and more of a hands-off attitude toward those nameless, faceless outsiders with whom we do not identify.
Indeed, much political and social conflict is, in essence, about where to draw this line, or at least where to shade a grey area. The economic theorist's highly abstract possibility of "side payments" between employed and unemployed workers is only one of many factors in labor relations.
If insiders are treated so differently from outsiders in the world at large, and so much hinges on the distinction, why should the workplace be entirely exempt from such influences?
In any event, I will here define insiders as workers having high seniority and outsiders as those having low seniority. A The firm's net profits are now ( 1 -\) (R(F(L) ) -ojL), and the net marginal value of an extra worker is (1-x)(R'F' -u))* Provided only that oj<w, the firm will wish to expand output and employment from its previous position.
No matter how one interprets the "other things being equal," a profit-sharing system is more expansionary than a wage system. If pay parameters are set so that workers are initially paid the same amount immediately after conversion from a wage into a profit-sharing system, the firm will wish to expand employment and output, thereby contracting its price (and pay The firm's profits are then
Using (5), equation (6) can be rewritten as
Long Run Equilibrium
Suppose that the insider workers permanently attached to each firm are organized into a union having some bargaining power. The union wants high pay ¥, while management wants high profits IT- These objectives are in conflict. The resolution is taken to be a weighted Nash bargaining solution which maximizes, for each firm, the function ¥^n^-^ (8) where b is a parameter representing the relative bargaining strength of the union compared to the firm. Note that it wou±d make no difference for the Nash bargaining solution if, instead of being expressed in nominal pay and profits, the formula (8) were expressed in terms of real pay W/P, or relative pay V/¥, or real profits n/P, since one firm and its union have no control over the. price level or pay elsewhere.
In effect, the outcome of the bargaining process can be described as follows.
Given any base wage and profit-sharing coefficient, by hypothesis the firm will set the employment level to maximize profits, which also determines (in a profit-sharing system) the level of pay. The "Nashian arbitrator" sets pay parameters at those levels which maximize (8) Lindbeck and Snower [1984] . Answers in terms of the opportunity cost of time spent in bargaining are given in Shaked and Sutton [1984] . There may even be "sociological" reasons, previously alluded to.
In this paper I merely assume as a polar case that it simply is not feasible for the firm to replace tenured insider workers by non-tenured outsiders, and hence, to a first approximation, relative bargaining strengths are independent of the outsiders.
It is slightly more convenient to work with a logarithmic version of 
The above employment function, sometimes denoted L(to) for brevity, must satisfy the following conditions:
L>0
(¥ith unemployed labor available, the profit-maximizing firm will hire workers to the point where the marginal revenue product of one more equals the base wage .
Case II (labor is supply constrained): if L=1 , L(a}) from (11) solves
(When the labor force is fully employed, the firm is constrained to pay at least the going rate.
Substituting L(ci)) from (11) into (9), the logarithm of the weighted Nash bargaining function with built-in employment reaction becomes
The following concept of a long run equilibrium will be used.
Definition:
A symmetric Nash equilibrium is a triple (a)*,L* (<l),P*) simultaneously satisfying:
(jO (o)* maximizes the weighted Nash product of pay and profits.)
(L* is the profit maximizing value of L.)
(P* is the profit maximizing value of P.) (Note that the macroeconomic equilibrium condition
is then automatically guaranteed by (3)«)
The Pure Wage System
At this point it is useful to treat specially the case X=0, both to gain an intuitive feel for the long run equilibrium concept (15)- (17) 
Then, suppressing extra variables where the meaning is otherwise clear,
where
With unemployed labor available to be hired (condition (19)), the Nashian arbitrator's maximand
will have an interior solution satisfying
or^.
i^-l)Kkl (24) w n(w)
Since from duality theory
condition (24) can be rewritten as
In any symmetric equilibrium situation where every firm is hiring the same amount of labor L and charging the same price P, the price elasticity of demand faced by the firm is, from (3), ,(L)=^1U^ ( 27) The monopoly "markup coefficient" of price over marginal cost is then p(L) .^ (28) SO that the profit maximizing price is
Profits are then
Substituting (30) into (26) yields the basic condition
or the optimal solution L*(b).
Equation (31 ) 
represents a NAIEU-like "natural-rate" unemployment level in the present model.
The expression S(L) .
4%f^-1
that appears in (31) is the ratio of profits to the wage bill, or "capital's share" divided by "labor's share", expressed as a function of the employment
As well as making good economic sense in its own right, condition (34) is needed to make L*(b) in equation (31 ) 
The condition (37) for the wage economy such that b<b (0) 
The Profit Sharing Economy
Imagine now that the government has statutorily fixed X at some positive value. The long run equilibrium (15)- (17) 
Each employed worker is then paid (46) and the Nashian arbitrator's maximand V(a);\) = b log W(to;x) + (l-b) logUiuiiX) (47) will have the interior solution
the first order condition (48) can be rewritten as 1 = S(L*)^E (50) where S(L) is defined by (33) , and E =^^ ( 51) dco W^-^î s the elasticity of pay with respect to the base wage.
In order to evaluate E, rewrite W, using (33), as
and differentiate (52) with respect to co, yielding
Substituting from (53) into (51) yields
Since the second term in (54) is negative, because S'>0 and L'<0, it can be deduced that Then it can be shown that
The proof is as follows. When b=b(x), the equilibrium condition (50), which is just holding on the borderline, becomes
where E(\) is the value of (54) for L=1 , aj=W*, i.e.,
With (18) also holding in equilibrium, (46) becomes 
Combining (61 ) with (57) yields (56), the proposition to be proved.
When b>b(x), so that u>0 and co>W*, it can easily be shown that the equilibrium price level is P = co^/F' = M/F.
Thus far equilibrium has been analyzed for b>b(\), a situation of positive unemployment. The rest of this section is devoted to characterizing an equilibrium in the full employment case b<;b(x), u=0, a)<W*.
In the full employment case the equilibrium solution is L* = 1 (62) W* = oj* + \(P*F(l)-co*) (63) r (1) TTT)^^^ŵ here W* is the competitive wage defined by (40).
Condition (63) 
When pay parameters are temporarily stuck (with quasi-fixed base wages satisfying (66)) but all other variables are free to adjust, the short run equilibrium price will accommodate according to the formula P = j^) (68) while hired labor and output remain at full employment levels. By 
If (70) is in effect, the solution of (71), (72) must cause the constraint (72) to hold with full equality.
The reason is that if (72) has a zero shadow price, then (71), (72) is equivalent to the problem But (75) 
Now when (76) holds, the supply constrained firm's pay is independent of co> since L(aj) automatically adjusts, by long term attrition and new hiring, to keep worker pay at W. In this case W=V independent of co , and the Nashian arbitrator's problem is reduced to maximizing the firm's profits
With L(cjj) defined as the solution to (71 ) under the constraint (76), the optimization problem (77) can be rewritten simply as
where the dummy variable w has been dropped because it is superfluous.
The solution of (78) Condition (63) is implied by (80), (81), and (76).
Condition (64) Suppose that in addition to (82) it is assumed that the markup of prices over wages in a wage system is approximately independent of the em-
Then the somewhat striking conclusion of this paper is that if workers were forced to receive some part of their pay as a share of per-capita profits and restricted to bargaining about base wages ( Suppose, though, that the coefficient of bargaining power for the insider workers of firm i is b-, which differs from firm to firm while always satis-
Then the story will be very similar in the aggregate to the case b.=b.
Average real pay will be the same under wage and profit-sharing systems. But the insider worker from a high-b. firm will be better off under a wage system, whereas the low-b. insider worker will fare better under economy-wide profit sharing. This does not at all mean that the low-b. insider will vote for profit sharing. For reasons similar to those already explained in the previous section, the low-b. insider will vote against profit sharing for his own firm even though he would personally get higher real pay if the entire economy were converted to a profit-sharing system. Furthermore, even if profit sharing were universal, the low-b-insider worker would vote to convert to a wage although, when all insiders unravel the profit-sharing system by so voting, the low-b. insider will be worse off. Aside from a great deal of casual empiricism, there is also some formal evidence for this proposition in a wage economy.
See Oswald [1984] . This point was first noted by Leontief [1946] . See also McDonald and Solow [1983] .
4.
See, e.g., Weitzman [1983] , [l985].
5.
See Weitzman [1985] . The size of these firm specific redistribution losses is bound to be further limited when it is considered that output and employment in the profit-sharing macroeconomy as a whole is stabilized and private insurance of profit shares could be used to make such losses even smaller.
11.
See Stiglitz [l984] , and the references contained therein, for a survey of some unemplojTnent theories. Gregory [1985] contains some interesting ideas on why a system may adapt to a wide range of NAIEU values. I believe these notions could be nicely integrated into the present framework.
12.
The one possible exception to lower equilibriiim unemployment under profit sharing is the efficiency wage class of theories.
In that framework wage and profit sharing systems could, depending on the specification, end up at the same equilibrium, with profit sharing losing its "excess demand for labor" property. But even in the efficiency wage context, the out-of-equilibrium behavior of a" profit-sharing system, when pay parameters are sticky, yields less unemployment than a wage system.
